From COP29 to COP30 : Whither the implementation of the Paris Agreement?

Following tensions in Baku, the UN climate process resumes in Bonn (June 16-26), with Brazil hoping to bridge divisions before COP30. This article was originally published in L'Économiste.

High expectations preceded COP29 in Baku, which was supposed to mark a crucial step towards the implementation of the Paris Agreement. This included attempts to define the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance, along with agreements on mitigation, Article 6 concerning carbon markets, and adaptation.

Although officially presented as a "Baku Climate Unity Pact", the main outcomes of COP29 were described as a "suicide pact" by some. Due to unresolved tensions stemming from interdependent issues, important decisions were postponed until 2025, notably on National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), the Global Stocktake (GST) dialogue, and the Just Transition Work Programme. Given the lack of ambition, particularly in the crucial area of finance, the disillusionment of developing countries was palpable at the conclusion of COP29. India and other delegations alluded to the process itself as a "travesty of justice."

Friends of the Paris Agreement now face not only a worrying gap between global ambition and announced national plans but also a significant gap between all these objectives and clearly insufficient means of implementation.

New Climate Finance Goal: From aspirations to disillusionment

After three years of intense negotiations aimed at overcoming the failure of the $100 billion target, the NCQG, unveiled late on November 24, proved disappointing. NCQG negotiations illustrated the disconnect between the climate emergency and the willingness of wealthy nations to commit substantial financial resources to the global effort. For most of the two-week summit, developed countries refused to propose quantified targets for the NCQG, prolonging the wait and thus the frustration of developing countries. Developing countries advocated for a mobilization goal of $1.3 trillion per year, while developed countries wanted this goal to be $300 billion by 2035. A simple calculation reveals the chasm separating the $300 billion goal from identified needs, which are between $5.01 and $6.85 trillion for developing countries up to 2030, according to their NDCs. Furthermore, the final decision sidesteps precision on crucial issues like the need for public funding in the form of grants, to avoid harmful debts, and ignores the need to establish quantitative sub-targets for mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage.

Nevertheless, the decision also offers a vague call for $1.3 trillion from "all public and private sources" by 2035 and mandates a "Baku to Belém Roadmap" to be developed by the current and incoming COP Presidencies by  COP30 in November. This Roadmap, not a negotiated item, is likely to be hampered by a lack of clarity regarding its implementation and the absence of robust accountability mechanisms. The Azerbaijani and Brazilian Presidencies have the crucial responsibility of developing this Roadmap and will inevitably face political choices in this endeavor, particularly in pointing to who should pay. If taking justice and equity into account, the Presidencies will have no choice but to recommend increased ambition from wealthy countries regarding provision of the public funds needed to implement the Paris Agreement.

Mitigation ahead of Belém: key objectives at risk

The progress made at COP28 regarding mitigation, including the ambition to triple renewable energy and transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, found no clear echo in Baku. Such clarity was prevented by the lack of consensus among the Parties, particularly in the context of finance talks.

The UAE Dialogue, intended to ensure the implementation of the GST outcomes, quickly revealed deep divisions among countries. While developed countries advocated for follow-up measures to accelerate the energy transition, other countries insisted that the process focus exclusively on means of implementation. Due to a lack of consensus around the proposed decision by the Presidency, the decision was postponed until 2025.

The Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) is at risk of similar fractures. In 2025, this MWP held its 5th global dialogue and investment event in May, focusing on mitigation solutions in the industry, AFOLU (Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use), and waste sectors, drawing on national and regional experience.

Nevertheless, COP29 did allow for the long-awaited operationalization of Article 6.4, the Paris Agreement mechanism for establishing carbon markets. While this advancement offers new opportunities for cooperation and carbon credit exchange, some experts point out that the pressure to reach an agreement came at the expense of safeguards for transparency and environmental integrity.

Adaptation and Loss and Damage: more (technical) questions than answers

The Loss and Damage Fund received $84.6 million in 2024—a meagre sum compared to the estimated annual losses and damages of over $400 billion in developing countries. It is difficult to see this as significant progress for those enduring the impacts of climate change.

As for the Adaptation Fund, for the second consecutive year, it missed its annual target of $300 million, reaching only $130 million. For communities facing imminent climate disasters, these figures are not simply disappointing; they are unacceptable given annual adaptation finance needs are estimated at $215-387 billion for developing countries.

Regarding the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), the most significant decision was to keep the GGA as a permanent agenda item beyond COP30, ensuring a space to discuss its long-term implementation. As part of the UAE-Belém Work Programme, countries agreed to provide guidance for further indicator refinement for GGA targets, including adding indicators related to means of implementation—a small victory championed by developing countries. But these advances are overshadowed by the absence of a dedicated sub-target for adaptation (or loss and damage) in the NCQG, a glaring gap that limits a truly ambitious global adaptation effort.

In view of COP30, the Brazilian presidency has affirmed a vision of "climate realism where adaptation occupies a central place" for all stakeholders. This could foreshadow a political revaluation of adaptation and Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement, exceeding its current primarily technical status in the UNFCCC.

2025: On the Road to SB62 and COP30, crucial deadlines to overcome COP29’s shortcomings

The year 2025 is supposed to represent a key milestone for countries, who are expected to submit their updated national contributions and plans (NDCs and NAPs), strengthening their mitigation and adaptation ambitions in line with the objectives of the Paris Agreement. However, the lack of ambition in Baku risks undermining the political will and trust essential to this process.

The latest NDC Synthesis Report clearly highlighted that achieving global temperature goals requires implementing the conditional components of NDCs, but realization of these is conditioned on a significant increase in financial support, technology transfer, and capacity building. Unfortunately, COP29 did not meet expectations in these areas. Given the low number of NDCs and NAPs submitted so far, the prospects for a significant update of international climate ambition seem concerning.

The lack of results on finance at COP29, a COP billed as the "Finance COP". raises questions for COP30 in Belém and beyond: Is this post-Paris process living up to its objectives? And who benefits from maintaining the status quo?

For communities on the front lines of the climate crisis, in Africa, the Arab region, and worldwide, the outcomes of COP29 are not mere diplomatic failures; they represent existential threats. The COP simply did not deliver the necessary ambition to drive adequate climate action. Finding the ambition to address the climate challenge—whether on mitigation, adaptation, or responding to loss and damage—has been postponed, but risks coming too late.

It should be noted that the incoming Brazilian presidency presents COP30 as "a moment of transition to a 'post-negotiation' phase of the UNFCCC." Pursuant to this, the COP30 Presidency seeks to actively mobilize a "mutirão" ("collective effort") of all types of non-state actors and the private sector. It specifically aspires to tackle a new type of opposition: "economic denial", which ignores that measures against climate change can be beneficial for the economy. It even calls on economists to speak to the economic benefits of climate action. However, though this denial is a real risk, economists cannot deny that markets are imperfect, making state support, strengthened international cooperation, and global reforms essential.

As for the Subsidiary Bodies (SB62) meetings of the UNFCCC that will take place in Bonn in June 2025, the incoming presidency seems determined to reframe the process, particularly by aiming to resolve the outstanding issues of the Global Stocktake and the UAE Dialogue. It remains to be seen whether this ambition is achievable and whether the distrust born of climate finance gaps will be overcome. The coming months will be decisive, but it is clear that the 2025 NDC cycle will mark a turning point — revealing persistent shortcomings, despite progress, and demand more profound commitment to cooperation under a new spirit of multilateralism.